The Expansive Power of the House of Representatives As a Precondition for Constitutional Rot

Authors

• Isnawati Isnawati, Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, 17 Agustus 1945 Samarinda University, Jl. IR H Juanda, SamarindaFollow
• Adam Setiawan, Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, 17 Agustus 1945 Samarinda University, Jl. IR H Juanda, Samarinda and Doctoral Student, Islam Indonesia University

Abstract

This study examines how the expansive powers of the Indonesian House of Representatives have contributed to constitutional rot because those powers no longer operate effectively or proportionately. It identifies dysfunction in the House of Representatives through weak legislative performance, inadequate oversight of the executive branch, and transactional political practices in appointment processes. Using a doctrinal legal method and contemporary constitutional theory as its analytical framework, this study argues that the expansive powers of the House of Representatives constitute a precondition for constitutional rot, evidenced by the poor exercise of legislative authority and institutional intervention through amendments to the Rules of Procedure. To realize constitutionalism, this study proposes limiting the exercise of such powers by strengthening checks and balances, enhancing the Constitutional Court's role in constitutional review through judicial activism, imposing term limits and stricter candidacy requirements for members of the House of Representatives, and reforming legislative practices.

Recommended Citation

Isnawati, Isnawati and Setiawan, Adam (2026) "The Expansive Power of the House of Representatives As a Precondition for Constitutional Rot," Padjadjaran Jurnal Ilmu Hukum (Journal of Law): Vol. 13: No. 2, Article 3.
Available at: https://journal.unpad.ac.id/pjih/vol13/iss2/3

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