Abstract
This article examines the tendency of Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR RI) in the 2024–2029 term to move toward a cartelized parliament within Indonesia’s multiparty presidential system. It addresses how the dominance of an oversized governing coalition after the 2024 election weakens parliamentary opposition and reduces the effectiveness of checks and balances over the executive. The study employs a qualitative explanatory approach using a single-case study design, process tracing, and documentary analysis. The data are drawn from official state and parliamentary documents, KPU decisions, legislative agendas, democracy monitoring reports, credible media coverage, and public statements by political elites. The findings show that the DPR remains electorally plural, yet most party factions are politically absorbed into the governing coalition. As a result, its legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions tend to operate through elite accommodation rather than democratic control. The cases of the TNI Law revision, the Police Law revision, the 2026 state budget, public protests over parliamentary allowances, and the heavy legislative agenda reveal the weakening of substantive opposition and the displacement of criticism into extra-parliamentary spaces. The article concludes that democratic decline can unfold legally and procedurally when parliament continues to function formally but loses its corrective capacity vis-à-vis the executive.
Recommended Citation
Dewi, Shanty Kartika and Fuad, Anis
(2026)
"Cartelized Parliament and the Decline of Legislative Oversight in Indonesia’s Multiparty Presidentialism,"
Jurnal Wacana Politik: Vol. 11:
Iss.
3, Article 7.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24198/jwp.v11i3.7
Available at:
https://journal.unpad.ac.id/wacanapolitik/vol11/iss3/7
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